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Abstract
This paper assumes that human capital is a composite of two types of knowledge and skills:
one is accumulated by formal education in schools and the other is accumulated through
working experiences in production activities. Introducing such a concept of human capital
into the standard Lucas−Uzawa model of endogenous growth, we show that a higher rate of
long−run growth is not necessarily associated with a higher level of education attainment.
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In the standard Lucas-Uzawa model of endogenous growth (Lucas 1988 and
Uzawa 1965), human capital is enhancedb yl e a r n i n gi nt h ep r o c e s so fe d u c a -
tion. As a result, the Lucas-Uzawa model concludes that the long-term growth
rate of the economy solely depends on the allocation of resources to education
activities. In particular, in the Lucas-Uzawa setting the education sector is as-
sumed to use human capital alone, so that a higher devotion of human capital
to education will promote long-term economic growth. Such a speciﬁcation of
human capital formation facilitates the analytical investigation of equilibrium
dynamics, which provides us with clear results concerning the transitional as well
as balanced-growth impacts of various policy experiments.1 A tt h es a m et i m e ,
the Lucas-Uzawa model fails to capture some relevant aspects of the relationship
between long-term growth and human capital formation. In particular, the model
concludes that a higher long-term growth rate is associated with a higher fraction
of human capital devoted to education. This result does not ﬁt well the reality at
least in advanced countries. Continuing increase in participation rate in higher
education and expansion of the average schooling years have not accelerated long-
term economic growth in many advanced countries.2 This fact suggests that the
mechanics of human capital formation assumed in the Lucas-Uzawa model needs
some modiﬁcation, if we intend to explain the observed relationship between ed-
ucation and growth.3
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that a slight modiﬁcation of the
Lucas-Uzawa model may reduce the discrepancy between the theoretical outcome
and the empirical ﬁnding. We assume that human capital is not a homogenous
stock created by schooling alone but a c o m p o s i t eo ft w ot y p e so fs t o c kv a r i -
ables: one is accumulated by formal education in schools and the other is accu-
mulated through working experiences in production activities. This assumption
means that the relation between education and human capital formation is not so
straightforward as that in the Lucas-Uzawa model. Since time available to each
agent is limited, a longer schooling that promotes investment for human capital
reduces labor participation rate in production activities, which depresses accu-
mulation of human capital due to learning by working. Because of the presence of
such a trade-oﬀ, a higher rate of human capital allocation to education may not
accelerate long-term growth. In fact, in our modiﬁed version of the Lucas-Uzawa
1See Faig (1995) and Chapter 5 in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) for through analytical
discussions of the Lucas model.
2Pritchett (2001) showes that there is no association between increases in labor-eﬃcinecy-
promoting human capital accumulation with the growth rate of the economy. In examining
the relation between schooling and growth, Bils and Klenow (2000) ﬁnd that the impact of
schooling on growth explains less than one-third of the empirical cross-country relationship.
3Noting that human capital used in applied work has been poorly proxied, Barro and Lee (
2001), Temple (2001) and Woessmann (2000) construct new measures for human capital stock.
They suggest that human capital accumulated by education exhibit diminishing returns.
1model, we ﬁnd that a lower rate of long-run growth would be associated with a
higher level of resource allocation to education activities.
2 The Model
The structure of our model basically follows Lucas (1988). There is a homogenous
ﬁnal good and its production technology is speciﬁed as
y = Ak
α (uh)
1−α , 0 < α < 1, (1)
where y is output, k is physical capital, h is human capital and u denotes the ratio
of human capital devoted to the ﬁnal goods production. Unlike Lucas (1988), we
assume that human capital is a composite of two types of stock variables. One of
them represents knowledge and skills obtained in the process of schooling (formal
education), while the other expresses knowledge and skills obtained on the job.
Namely, we assume that human capital is enhanced by schooling as well as by
learning-by-doing in production activities.4 More speciﬁcally, we assume that
h = E
θL
1−θ, 0 < θ < 1, (2)
where E is a cumulative stock of knowledge obtained in the process of educa-









u(τ)h(τ)dτ, η > 0.
These expressions mean that E and L are represented by cumulative sums of
human capital services used for education and production, respectively. The
above deﬁnitions give
˙ E = δ(1 − u)h, (3)
˙ L = ηuh. (4)
Here, parameters δ and η respectively denote the speeds of leaning in schooling
and working.
There is no population growth and the number of households is normalized
to one. In what follows, we assume that each household purposefully selects its
4In the labor economics literature, it has been a popular idea that human capital formation
depends on the job training as well as on the formal education: see, for example, Ben-Porath
(1967). In order to construct an analytically tractable growth model, we use a much simpler
formulation of human capital investment than those used by the microeconomic studies on
education and human capital.
2education level by controlling u, but the learning by doing eﬀect in production
is external to an individual: accumulation of human capital through working
experiences is a by-product of production and the household takes it as an external
eﬀect. The ﬂow budget constraint for the representative household is
˙ k = rk + wuh+ s(1 − u)wh− c − T, (5)
where c is consumption, r the rate of return to physical capital, w the real wage
rate, s the rate of education subsidy (0 ≤ s<1), and T denotes a lump-sum tax.
Following Lucas (1988), we assume that education service is not a market good
so that there is no education industry. As a result, the household’s income equals
rk+wuh. In addition, the household is assumed to receive an education subsidy
from the government that is proportional to the opportunity cost of education,
(1 − u)wh.T h e g o v e r n m e n t ﬁnances its expenditure for subsidy by lump-sum
taxation, so that the government budget constraint is s(1 − u)wh = T.W e
assume that the government adjusts T to satisfy this equation under a ﬁxed level
of s.







−ρtdt, ρ > 0, σ > 0
subject to (5), h = Eθ¯ L1−θ, and the dynamic equation of the stock of knowledge
created by education:
˙ E = δ(1 − u)E
θ¯ L
1−θ, (6)
In the above, ¯ L indicates that the level of L is external to the household: when




given. For notational simplicity, we assume that neither physical capital nor
knowledge capital depreciates.
To derive the optimization conditions fo rt h eh o u s e h o l d ,w es e tu pt h eH a m i l -








1−θ + s(1 − u)wE
θ¯ L





where p and q denote shadow values of physical capital and the stock of knowledge
obtained by education, respectively. We ﬁnd that the optimization conditions
include:
max
c H ⇒ c
−σ = p, (7)
max
u H ⇒ (1 − s)wp = δq, (8)
˙ p = p(ρ − r), (9)








Note that in deriving (10) we use (8).
Since the number of households is one, the symmetric equilibrium condition
requires that ¯ L = L. In the competitive equilibrium, the rate of return to physical
capital and real wage rate respectively given by r = ∂y/∂k = αA(k/uh)
α−1 and
w =( 1− α)A(k/uh)
α . Thus (8) gives w = A(1 − α)(k/uh)











As a result, (9) can be written as
˙ p
p
= ρ − αA
∙
δ






Now let us deﬁne:
x = E/L, z = q/p, v = c/k.
From (3), (4) and ˙ x/x = ˙ E/E − ˙ L/L, it holds that
˙ x
x
= δ(1 − u)x
θ−1 − ηux
θ. (13)



























































Finally, in order to derive the dynamic equation of u, notice that logarithmic
diﬀerentiation of both sides of (11) yields α(˙ k/k − ˙ u/u − ˙ h/h)=˙ z/z. Hence,








and using (3), (4) and (14), we



















A(1 − α)(1− s)
¶α−1
α
−v − θδ(1 − u)x
θ−1 − η(1 − θ)ux
θ. (18)
In sum, we have derived a complete dynamic system consisting of (13), (14),
(17) and (18) that describe the dynamic behaviors of x(= E/L),z (= q/p),
v(= c/k)a n du.
3 E d u c a t i o na n dG r o w t hi nt h eL o n gR u n


























where g denotes the balanced-growth rate. The stationary conditions in (13),
(14), (17) and (18) respectively give the following:
δ(1 − u)x
θ−1 − ηux















A(1 − α)(1− s)
¶α−1
α















A(1 − α)(1− s)
¶α−1
α
− v − ηux
θ =0 . (22)
By use of (19), we obtain u = δxθ−1/
¡
δxθ−1 + ηxθ¢





















Namely, the factor intensity in human capital formation on the balanced-growth path depends
on the relative speed of leraning, δ/η, as well as on the relative allocation of human capital,
(1 − u)/u, to education and working.
5Using this relation, we see that the condition ˙ E/E = g yields
g = δ
θη
1−θ (1 − u)
θ u
1−θ ≡ F (u). (24)
In view of (16), (21) and (24), we obtain
g =
ρ(1 − s)(1− u)
θ − σ(1 − s)(1− u)
≡ G(u). (25)
Equations (24) and (25) simultaneously determine the balanced-growth rate, g,
and the steady-state rate of human-capital allocation to production, u.
First, notice that the original Lucas model assumes that θ =1( s ot h a th = E).
If θ =1 , equation (24) reduces to g = δ(1 − u). Using this and (25) with





. Consequently, if ρ or σ decreases, then
both g and 1 − u increase. If the rate of education subsidy, s, increases, then
g and 1 − u rise as well. Note that the steady-state value of u is given by
u =1+( ρ/σδ)−(1/σ)(1− s), a n dt h u sa ni n c r e a s ei nδ also raises g and 1−u.
As a consequence, in the Lucas model, any parameter change that raises the
balanced-growth rate is associated with an increase in the human capital alloca-
tion to education, 1 − u.
If 0 < θ < 1, the the graph of F (u) is inverse U-shaped and its maximum
level is attained where u =1−θ. Additionally, F (0) = F (1) = 0. Function G(u)
is monotonically decreasing with G(0) = ρ(1 − s)/[θ − σ(1 − s)] and G(1) = 0.
Therefore, provided that θ > σ(1 − s), it is easy to see that there is a unique
steady state with g>0a n du ∈ (0,1). Figure 1 depicts the graphs of F (u)a n d
G(u). In panel (a) the steady-state value of u is less than 1−θ, while it exceeds
1 − θ in panel (b).
As an example of the long-run comparative statics, consider the eﬀects of a
change in the education subsidy rate, s. When s increases, G(u)c u r v es h i f t s
downward. Hence, the steady-state value of u decreases, while the balanced
growth rate decreases (increases) if the initial level of u is smaller (larger) than
1 − θ. That is, a higher education subsidy promotes a larger devotion of human
capital to education, i.e. an increase in 1 − u, but it accelerates long-run growth
only when the initial allocation of human capital to education satisﬁes 1 − u<
θ.6 A rise in the education subsidy reallocates human capital from production
to education, and thus it has a negative impact on human capital formation
through learning by doing on the job. If this negative eﬀect on the leaning eﬀect
in production dominates the positive growth eﬀect of education enhancement,
human capital formation is decelerated and the long-term growth rate will be
lowered. In contrast, a higher eﬃciency of education (that is a larger value of δ)
produces an upward shift of F (u)c u r v e .T h u sar i s ei nδ presents a higher long-
term growth rate with a higher level of human capital allocation to education.
6The eﬀects of decreases in ρ and σ have the same eﬀects on g and u as those given by a
rise in s.
6Figure 1:
Similarly, an increase in η also raises g and 1 − u. Higher learning speeds both
in formal education and in working places, therefore, contribute to promoting
growth as well as education attainment.
The above discussion shows that the positive relation between long-term
growth and education can be obtained if the balanced-growth equilibrium is char-
acterized by panel (b) in Figure 1. Other things being equal, the situation of panel
(b) tends to hold, if θ is large or if s is small. A large θ means that knowledge
and skills obtained in formal education is relatively important in human capital
formation, so that it is easy to establish the growth-enhancing eﬀect of education.
A smaller s indicates that education subsidy is not high enough to attains the
maximum balanced-growth rate. Given θ and s, the situation like panel (b) can
hold if ρ and σ are relatively high or if δ and η are relatively low. In sum, the con-
ditions for establishing the situation in panel (b) are satisﬁed, if education share
of human capital is high, the education subsidy is low, and the speeds of learning
both in schools and in work places are not high enough. Conversely, an economy
with a highly developed education system and enough government’s subsidy for
education tends to have the steady state characterized by panel (a). This sug-
gests that the positive relationship between education and long-term growth may
not be observed in advanced countries that have already realized high levels of
education attainment.
It is to be pointed out that we have focused on the balanced-growth equi-
librium and a simple policy experiment. Future research should examine the
dynamic behavior of the model economy out of the balanced-growth path and
present more general discussion of various policy eﬀects in our setting.
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